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Abstract The field of epigenetics is leading to new concep-
tualizations of the role of environmental factors in health and
genetic disease. Although more evidence is required, epige-
netic mechanisms are being implicated in the link between
low socioeconomic status and poor health status. Epigenetic
phenomena work in a number of ways: they can be established
early in development, transmitted from previous generations
and/or responsive to environmental factors. Knowledge about
these types of epigenetic traits might therefore allow us to
move away from a genetic deterministic perspective, and pro-
vide individuals with the opportunity to change their health
status. Although this could be equated with patient empower-
ment, it could also lead to stigmatization and discrimination
where individuals are deemed responsible for their health,
even if they are not in social situations where they are able
to enact change that would alter their health status. In this
paper, we will explore the responsibilities of different actors
in the healthcare sphere in relation to epigenetics across four
different contexts: (1) genetic research, (2) clinical practice,
(3) prenatal care and (4) the workplace. Within this explora-
tion of role responsibilities, we will also discuss the potential
constraints that might prevent the patient, mother-to-be, re-
search participant or employee, from enacting any necessary
steps in order to increase their health status in response to
epigenetic information.
Keywords Epigenomics . Social values . Informed consent .
Social discrimination . Research subjects . Research ethics
Introduction
Epigenetics encompasses interactions between living condi-
tions, lifestyle, gene expression and health whose effects
might be inherited by future generations (Gilbert and Epel
2009). The field of epigenetics has become consolidated over
the last decade for several reasons. The first driving factor was
the ‘failure’ of the Human Genome Project to assist us in a
complete understanding of the nature of all genetic disease.
This led to the conceptualization that genetics alone cannot
explain the most basic dynamics of living beings, such as how
inheritance works (Maher 2008). In addition, technological
advancements brought about within ‘omics’ disciplines has
led to the transfer of their methods and approaches into bio-
logical laboratories in order to realize economies of scale
(Hilgartner 2004; Rose and Rose 2013).
Despite its recent establishment as a field, in its early form,
epigenetics developed about a century ago through the embry-
ological studies carried out by Charles Manning Child,
Conrad H. Waddington and Joseph Needham (D’Abramo
2017). The idea behind epigenetics consisted of considering
organisms as a product of the interaction between genetic and
environmental factors. Child, Waddington and Needham were
politically engaged—Child was a biologist with reformatory
ideas, whereas Waddington and Needham embraced the
Marxist ideology to different degrees. This resulted in all three
men placing a central emphasis on the environment, in both its
material and social components. The principles behind
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epigenetics are that (i) environmental and behavioural factors,
in a more or less direct manner, act at the biological/
physiological level, such that these external factors elicit epi-
genetic dynamics that control and coordinate genes during all
the developmental phases of the organism, and (ii) these bio-
logical dynamics controlled by behavioural and environmen-
tal factors are heritable to future cells and generations
(Jablonka and Raz 2009). This is reminiscent of the historical
Lamarckian concepts of inheritance of acquired characters, for
which the initial proposal of epigenetics was, and still is,
framed within the critical debate that considers the relation-
ship between science and ideology (Gissis and Jablonka 2011;
Jablonka and Lamb 2005).
As shown by Schicktanz, during the last decades, the social
and political framework has changed deeply so that we can
define the concept of responsibility in three phases
(Schicktanz 2016). The first phase, from the 1960s on, was
focused on collective responsibilities towards future genera-
tions, human kind or nature. In the second phase that started in
the mid-1970s, responsibility was focused on professional
responsibilities towards individuals, as shown by the rise of
informed consent. In the third, starting in the 1990s, it was an
intertwining of social and individual responsibility, a trend
that mirrored a reaction to political reforms cutting back pub-
lic welfare and health care (Schicktanz 2016).
From a technical perspective, the term ‘epigenetics’ refers
to mechanisms involved in the regulation of cell type, tran-
scription within specific tissues or expression of genes where
there is no change in the DNA sequence (Ku et al. 2011).
There are a number of ways in which this non-DNA gene
regulation can occur. One biochemical modification involved
is DNAmethylation, where a methyl group is added to part of
the DNA sequence, leading to activation or repression of the
transcription of that gene (Ku et al. 2011). Regulation can also
occur through histone modification, nucleosome positioning
and expression of non-coding RNAs, among other mecha-
nisms. The result of these changes is the winding, unwinding
and clumping of the DNA which alter the degrees to which
certain genes are expressed (Ku et al. 2011).
There are several ways in which these epigenetic changes
are thought to relate to the development of disease. One pre-
dominant theory relates to the developmental origins of health
and disease (DOHaD) hypothesis in which exposure to exter-
nal factors during critical developmental phases, often in
utero, are thought to influence an organism’s predisposition
to disease (Barker 2007). These environmental factors can
take a number of forms, such as the presence of pathogens,
exposure to toxins and the availability of nutrients and water
(Bateson et al. 2004). The theory is that during a ‘critical
period when a system is plastic and sensitive to the environ-
ment’, this exposure takes place which ‘programs’ the genome
of the organism to function at a certain capacity through these
epigenetic regulatory components (Barker 2007). Consider,
for example, a pregnant woman who is undernourished. The
exposure of the fetus to the reduced levels of nutrition it is
receiving from the mother is thought to lead to changes in the
metabolic interaction between the mother and the fetus in
different ways, depending on (a) when it happens during fetal
development and (b) how prolonged the period of undernour-
ishment lasts (Barker et al. 1993). These metabolic changes
relate to growth hormones which can affect the development
of a number of different tissues, such as the development of
the pancreatic cells and also the vascular system, as well as
affect placental and/or fetal growth which results in a smaller
baby at term (Barker et al. 1993). While in some cases these
changes might be transient, often these critical periods of de-
velopmental plasticity are ‘followed by loss of plasticity and a
fixed functional capacity’ (Barker 2007).
This exposure might then impact on the disease status of the
fetus in a number of different ways. Barker uses his own re-
search to highlight that programming that takes place during
maternal undernourishment during critical periods of plasticity
in pregnancy might lead to the poor development of the vas-
cular system. This is not adaptive to the future environment of
the fetus but may reflect how the fetus is developing in order to
adapt to the reduced available nutrition (Barker 2007). The
result is that the undernourished fetus may develop cardiovas-
cular disease in adulthood, regardless of the environmental
factors that it is exposed to after birth (Barker et al. 1993).
In contrast, there are other situations where, in conjunction
with this early programming, the lifestyle or exposures of the
adult may also contribute to the development of disease. An
example of this would be the high incidence of non-insulin-
dependent diabetes in people who had low weight at birth or
during infancy but who developed obesity in adulthood
(Barker et al. 1993). In this example, the programming was
present which resulted from exposure to maternal undernour-
ishment and subsequent changes in glucose-insulin metabo-
lism during fetal development. Yet, the development of obe-
sity and the challenge this presents to the pancreas lead to the
onset of diabetes. This model of disease development has been
labelled the ‘mismatch model’, because the rationale behind it
is that the early programming in environments where food is
in short supply might actually have an adaptive quality.
However, when the environment changes, such as when food
is in abundance, the programming becomes maladaptive and
leads to the development of disease (Bateson et al. 2004).
At this stage, research investigating the potential for inter-
ventions in order to change our epigenomes to improve health
status is still in its infancy and much of the evidence to date,
particularly in relation to the potential for transgenerational
inheritance of epigenetic phenomena, has come from animal
studies (Joly et al. 2016). In addition, researchers working in
the field hold quite divergent views about the significance of
epigenetics, with some ‘champions’ believing that it is the key
to understanding what we know from traditional genetics, and
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other, more skeptical researchers disagreeing that epigenetics
drastically changes our knowledge in the field (Tolwinski
2013). Despite these reservations, the new-found knowledge
of how epigenetics can impact on disease could have great
power and there are hopes that it may provide us with an
opportunity to move away from a genetic deterministic per-
spective and allow individuals the ability to change their
health status (Canning 2008; Van de Vijver et al. 2002).
While this could be equated with patient empowerment, we
need to be aware that it could also lead to stigmatization and
discrimination where individuals are deemed responsible for
their health, even if they are not in social situations where they
are able to enact changes that could alter their health status.
Given that epigenetics is already receiving considerable media
coverage (Lappe 2016), the concerns about potential misun-
derstandings, discrimination and stigmatization need careful
consideration sooner rather than later (Cozzens and
Woodhouse 1995).
In addition, we need to be aware of the potential for the
field of epigenetics to get stuck in adopting a ‘technical fix’
approach. This trend, which has developed over the last de-
cades due to the collaboration between the private/financial
sector and the public institutions of research (Young et al.
2008), has changed the functioning and aims of research,
leading to overlap between financial and academic aims
(Cozzens and Woodhouse 1995; Etzkowitz and Webster
1995). Technological fixes are indeed instrumental to finan-
cial dynamics focused on handling societal problems within
private corporate structures. This approach in turn fuels a def-
icit model where people are conceived as ignorant and in need
of education regarding scientific arguments (Irwin andWynne
2003; Wynne 2014). The concern is that epigenetics might
also follow this trend where innovation (e.g. production of
therapeutics and diagnostics through use of patents and intel-
lectual property rights) might supersede public goods (e.g.
policies to incentivize health promotion), which in turn could
easily lead to a range of moral discourses subjecting women,
patients and citizens to increased scrutiny (Kenney andMüller
2016; Meloni 2016a; Pickersgill 2016). In addition, the public
may not want to be ‘educated’ in this regard and may react
negatively to experts wanting to discipline them without the
presence of shared values, which can hinder the fair transla-
tion of responsibilities in the public sphere.
The interaction of knowledge built by experts and recep-
tion of that knowledge by the public has been scrutinized in
different manners, so that some categories/criteria were for-
mulated to describe the more or less basic steps to understand
allocation of responsibilities (Hedlund 2012; Schicktanz
2016). In order for an agent to be responsible for an action
or situation, a number of criteria must be met. First, there
needs to be a causal link between the agent and the situation
under consideration (Young 2006). Second, they have to be
aware, or cognizant, that their action caused the event
(Hedlund 2012). Third, there needs to be a motivation for
the agent to act in a certain way that is societally or culturally
agreed upon (e.g. obligations, rewards, incentives, encourage-
ment, etc.), rather than just based on the agent’s own will
(Gilbert 1993; Hedlund 2012). And fourth, the agent needs
to be able to exercise some degree of control over the situation
and to be able to exercise autonomy in her choice to act (or
not) to cause that action (Fischer 2006; Hedlund 2012). In
relation to responsibilities in epigenetics, Dupras has warned
against assigning epigenetic responsibilities too readily to in-
dividuals without proper consideration of ‘the ambiguous na-
ture of epigenetic mechanisms’ (Dupras and Ravitsky 2016).
Moreover, Schicktanz has highlighted genetic responsibility,
that here we place on the same level as epigenetic responsi-
bility, as a notion to identify the internalization of individual
feelings of guilt or self-restriction (Schicktanz 2016).
Likewise, in contrast with the normative position of
Hedlund, Pickersgill and colleagues have argued, that bio-
medical research in epigenetics will create further ways in
which individuals can be made responsible, as caretakers of
life that does not yet exist (Pickersgill 2016). We will not
attempt to provide any specific solution to the issues raised
in this paper, as we think political problems need to be ad-
dressed by local communities in order to initiate a negotiation
with both public and private scientific institutions. A common
idea runs through all four contexts analysed below that relates
to the social, political, behavioural and environmental factors
as determinants of health. This idea that the context influ-
ences, determines or causes biological and health changes
traces back to Hippocrates, among others, who more than
two thousand years ago described environmental, social and
political factors as determinants of health (Jones 1957). Jean-
Baptiste de Lamarck and, to a lesser extent, Charles Darwin
also focused on the effect of environmental conditions on
biological variations. More recently, institutions like the
World Health Organization (WHO) and the International
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) have developed anal-
yses and interventions around the relevance of social factors
on health (i.e. working conditions, diet, educations, poverty,
living habits, education, etc.) (James and Ronald 2012;
Marmot 2015; Marmot and Wilkinson 2005; Tomatis 1997;
World Health Organization 2013). In addition, challenging
programs on epigenetics and DOHaD are pointing precisely
at the manner in which social and material context modulates
health of humans (Párrizas et al. 2012; Rosenfeld 2015), for
instance, how globalization might impact on epigenetic pat-
terns and non-communicable diseases (Vineis et al. 2014).
With this in mind, in this paper, we explore the responsibilities
of different actors in the healthcare sphere in relation to epi-
genetic testing across four different contexts: (1) genetic re-
search, (2) clinical diagnostics, (3) prenatal care and 4) the
workplace; and discuss the potential constraints that might
prevent the patient, research participant, employee or
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mother-to-be, from enacting any necessary steps in order to
increase their health status based on epigenetic information.
Scenario 1—genetic research
A research team is conducting a study investigating the impact
of night shifts on risk of developing breast cancer. The team
explores the hypothesis that the disruption of the circadian
rhythms caused by working at night, and the exposure to the
lighting used in these workplaces, alters patterns of gene ex-
pression and melatonin homeostasis, leading to the develop-
ment of cancer. This is based on previous research showing an
association between night shifts, circadian rhythms and breast
cancer (Fenga 2016; IARC 2010a; Reszka and Przybek 2016;
Stevens 2009; Straif et al. 2014). This association may be
explained either as deregulation of the genes’ expression for
the changes of endocrine levels caused byworking at nights or
as the effect of the presence of some genetic polymorphisms in
the circadian pathway genes responsible for increasing breast
cancer risk when triggered by disruption of circadian rhythms.
The project, as with many other scientific endeavours, is a
public-private partnership (Meslin et al. 2015; Perkmann et al.
2013). In order to conduct it, the research team sets up a
biobank of biological samples from shift workers which will
comprise blood and hair. The DNA from the samples will be
analysed to look for single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)
and epigenetic patterns of the genes’ expression using geno-
mic sequencing (GS). The findings of the research may lead to
new insights into policy-making for cancer prevention or po-
tential innovative treatments for cancer patients.
One unclear aspect of this research relates to the proximity
of the two hypotheses of the project. While apparently com-
plementary, they address the problem in two different man-
ners. An epigenetic approach might focus on links between
gene expression, endocrine factors, circadian rhythms and
working at night. Within this model, the individuals’ physiol-
ogy might be considered in order to develop interventions at
either the environmental level, such as reducing shifts and
altering the lighting of the working place, or at the endocrine
level, such as producing pharmaceutical agents able to restore
the levels of melatonin and estrogen which leads to a deregu-
lation of genes expression underpinning cancer initiation and
development. Instead, the genetic explanation based on
genome-wide association studies (GWAS), conducted to dis-
cover single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with can-
cer susceptibility, confers to women a predisposition based on
innate, genetic characteristics. This could lead researchers to
discover genetic pathways to act upon through the use of
targeted drugs. These two approaches support two different
models, one which considers individuals as dynamic systems
changing together with their environments, and another
considering individuals as a fixed nexus of mechanisms,
mainly determined by their genes or epigenetic characteristics.
But are the two approaches really complementary or are
they opposed? The erroneous presupposition here consists of
conferring certain powers to certain specific technologies and
models of causation, so that epigenetic and epigenomic anal-
yses using GS should lead to an epistemic, causal justice,
where models and practices utilized by scientists grant onto-
logical primacy to DNA—i.e. the phenotype is the result of
either environment or genotype. It is instead necessary to con-
sider a more dynamic and comprehensive relationship be-
tween individuals and their environments, in order to over-
come causal impasses affecting the possibility to formulate
an aetiological explanation, i.e. the phenotype is the result of
the interaction between environment and genotype, and in no
case are two genotypes identical in their reactions (Lewontin
2006; Waddington 1953). Both genotypes and environments
are causes of phenotypic variations, and as such necessary
objects of study to understand phenotypes or diseases
(D’Abramo 2014). As both Richardson and Meloni highlight,
the modern programs of research on human epigenetics do not
challenge genetic determinism and biological reductionism.
Instead, epigenetics might be used to pathologise the poor or
reinforce the biological differences or inferiority of individ-
uals living in disadvantaged social conditions (Meloni 2016a;
Richardson 2015). When epigenetics considers either the ge-
notype or the environment, it might easily lead to discrimina-
tion by allocating responsibilities to (biological functioning
of) individuals without producing any increase in power to
impact on social, individual or physiological determinants of
health. Indeed, epigenetics may rely on empirical evidences
produced within laboratories where the foreseen interventions
are mainly conceived at the molecular level. How the new
postgenomic science of epigenetics will allocate responsibili-
ties to realize particular types of social justice, after having
molecularised the social milieu and biographies of individuals
(Niewöhner 2011), is yet to be determined (Del Savio et al.
2015; Loi et al. 2013; Waggoner and Uller 2015). Allocation
of social and individual responsibilities through scientific re-
search also pertains to perspectives of longue durée, where the
metaphysical presupposition of translating social and cultural
issues in molecular terms formulated some decades ago
(Hacking 1995; Waddington 1967) will propel part of the
future biomedical research.
In order to disentangle the social effects of scientific prac-
tices, it might be useful to consider the roles and interactions
among responsible stakeholders. A matrix that heuristically
inspired the analysis of the case here presented was recently
sketched in respect of ‘genetic risk and responsibility’
(Schicktanz 2016). In our scenario, the main actor is a hypo-
thetical principal investigator (PI). The PI is constrained, both
through the working contract they sign when they commence
their role and the evaluation processes of scientific research, of
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which dissemination of findings is a significant component. If
the research project is carried out using public funds and in-
frastructures, it is fair to expect results to benefit taxpayers
who indirectly fund biomedical research. Therefore, as a mor-
al agent, the PI has a responsibility towards amoral object, the
taxpayers, and is supervised by ethical committees, institu-
tional review boards and bureaucratic mechanisms. The stan-
dards he applies are derived from scientific customs, or re-
search ethos, and have certain consequences that are framed
within a precarious labour market. The principal investigator
also has the burden of securing both his own salary and the
wages of the research team. However, determining how to
balance the responsibilities of the PI towards taxpayers and
the workers engaged in medical research is a complex issue. In
fact, it is likely that some conflicts between these two social
responsibilities might arise. Imagine that the PI secured pri-
vate funds through a pharmaceutical company which he uses
to pay the postdoctoral researchers. Also, imagine that he dis-
courages researchers from scrutinizing results that suggest that
epigenetic factors increasing the women’s risk of breast cancer
could be reversed by altering the night shifts themselves and
encourages them to focus on results that suggest a potential for
pharmacological interventions. The PI wants to secure future
funds from the same foundation and is therefore prone to
please the interests of the foundation trustees. In other words,
the principal investigator wants to give his ‘scientific’ contri-
bution to support the working place’s profits through the in-
tensive pace of production required. With the best of inten-
tions, the principal investigator is primarily concerned about
his own salary and of his team. In pleasing the funding body
by excluding some hypotheses from the project, is he being
unfair to research participants that are also taxpayers? And if
so, is the principal investigator accountable for having subor-
dinate subjects of research to job positions of his research
team? Here, it seems that some aspects characteristic of
funding bodies and of hierarchical order of biomedical re-
search might narrow the possible gamut of hypotheses, and
eventual solutions, for social medical problems, to legitimize a
deterministic stance (i.e. that problems derived from social
conditions like working at night are mainly biological prob-
lems) by means of anti-reductionistic, postgenomic
approaches.
Another problem researchers might face is of epistemic
nature and relates to the possibility of reversing epigenetic
dynamics. The debate, on which there is no consensus, sur-
rounds the possibility of reducing social dynamics to biolog-
ical ones; diseases derived from certain working conditions
are reduced to biomedical problems. Based on the answer to
whether it is possible to reverse specific epigenetic biological
factors in women who develop breast cancer because they
work night shifts, and on the fact that ethics committees often
do not encourage dissemination of findings apart from in sci-
entific articles, researchers will decide if it is worth
communicating the results of the study to the women engaged
in the research. The question of reversibility of epigenetic
factors is related to the aims of the research themselves. If
researchers also consider the possibility of influencing those
who are empowered to influence policy relating to the fre-
quency and length of night shifts, then the possibility of ad-
dressing the problemmight materialize. The potential to find a
solution might then increase not only the desire but also the
responsibility of researchers to communicate the findings of
the research to participants. Nevertheless, the PI’s drive to
secure future funding by pleasing the funding body might
easily translate into a reluctance to consider other solutions
which would alter the current high production rhythms of
workers.
If researchers are not inhibited by this ‘pleasing chain’ of
the precarious labour market (i.e. doing research to support
policies dismantling public welfare and healthcare systems),
they might instead aim to identify primary interventions from
their research findings, in order to prevent women working
night shifts from developing cancer. They might then consider
communicating the outcomes of their research to employers
and policy-makers to contribute to a negotiation between em-
ployers and employees. Both the genetic and epigenetic
models we described, the former indicating that women who
might develop cancer because of their genetic makeup, and
the latter indicating the incidence showed by cohort studies
engaging women working in specific working settings, could
be used to develop primary interventions, and make policies
addressing the safety of workers.What if, however, there is no
other manner to address cancer predisposition aside from by
not working at night? Is it responsible for researchers to com-
municate a risk for which no solutions are envisaged and that
might eventually result in a deterioration of the participants’
social factors? For example, workers who live in an area
where there is a high rate of unemployment might be faced
with the choice to either work or be healthy.
In addition, researchers might be constrained in their ability
to communicate the specific aims of the study to participants,
because the research aims of investigating genetic polymor-
phisms and epigenetic patterns associated with cancer initia-
tion and development may not have any direct translational
outcomes for policy, diagnostics, or therapeutics, at least not in
the short/medium term. Therefore, even if researchers would
like to communicate more specific aims with participants, they
may not be able to do so, as they cannot foresee the transla-
tional or social value of their research (researchers mostly
work to publish articles that might increase their chance to
secure a future job). This lack of information in turn inhibits
the participants’ ability to make autonomous decisions about
entering the research study, as well as their ability to be active-
ly engaged. This lack of engagement may then inhibit the
researchers’ ability to ask participants for more information,
for instance, to enrich the study with updated individual
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phenotypic data. These aspects of the research that are deeply
determined by the nature of private-public partnership (i.e. the
‘unknowability’ of aims, inability to actively engage partici-
pants, lack of communication between researchers and partic-
ipants, overlapping of social and for-profit/innovative aims,
etc.) constrain the manner in which researchers create the sci-
entific facts that will eventually be used to assign responsibil-
ity at certain levels.
Engagement of the private sector in biomedical research
and epidemiology is not a novelty and is necessary to different
degrees (e.g. technological tools that are supplied by corpora-
tions). A question that might help to shape a constructive
debate regard the roles and modalities of engagement of the
private sector in public health. Indeed, rather than the private
nature of the funds, what creates the problem is the private
nature of some dynamics which shapes the research, such as
the PI shaping the aims of the research by excluding public
health interventions to please the foundation’s trustee and anti-
welfare policies. This impasse is tightly bound to issues relat-
ed to labour market policies. One could imagine that using a
broad consent approach, in which the aims, benefits and risks
of research are not necessarily discussed in detail, would mean
that the origin of funding and the research aims would not be
disclosed (D’Abramo 2015; D’Abramo et al. 2015; Hofmann
2009). Most of the time, broad consent translates into secrecy
about the for-profit nature of the research, whereas open dis-
closure of funding and the aims of the research might clarify
the boundary between private and public interests (Jasanoff
2002; Krimsky 2005; Krimsky and Nader 2004). In turn, this
aspect influences the role of scientists in their interaction with
the public, so that other questions might be better addressed,
such as how biomedical research can encourage an open dia-
logue across scientists, citizens, patients and stakeholders.
However, is epigenetics, that was developed as a discipline
which captures the dynamic, dialectical interaction between
organisms and their environments, instead proposing a
narrower concept of environment which cuts off those factors
the supporters of anti-welfare reforms want to remain
undisputed?
Indeed, lines of biomedical research are principally shaped
through devices that, besides being a fair approach to the
privatization of science, can also produce profits—i.e. data
production, data sharing, patents and intellectual properties
(Sunder Rajan 2006; Sunder Rajan and Leonelli 2013).
Does it mean that medical research driven by a corporate logic
is not capable of producing facts that underpin preventive,
welfare-supporting policies? And if these preventive policies
are then produced, are these policies, at any point, confronted
with the values of participants of research? Are any of the
outcomes of research co-constructed by researchers and lay
people? These questions lead us to consideration of the role of
patients and healthy recipients of preventive, diagnostics and
therapeutic practices.
Scenario 2—clinical care
A 52-year-old male goes to a general practitioner, because he
is experiencing difficulty urinating during the day and also
increased frequency of urination during the night. His father
developed prostate cancer, and he is concerned that his symp-
toms are similar to those his father experienced. The doctor
performs a digital rectum examination, which suggests some
inflammation, and takes a blood sample for a prostate-specific
antigen test. The doctor has been reading about new bio-
markers for prostate cancer and decides to send a sample from
the patient for a test to investigate DNA methylation. While
the PSA is within the normal range, indicating the patient does
not have prostate cancer, the DNA methylation test identifies
that the patient has a higher than average level of global hy-
pomethylation. This can lead to genomic instability, focal
hypermethylation of promoter regions in tumour suppressor
genes and, subsequently, a high risk of cancer. This hypome-
thylation could be due to a number of factors, including the
fact that he grew up in a poor area, but also his tendency to
smoke 40 cigarettes a day, his poor diet and heavy drinking.
The doctor advises the patient that in order to reduce his risk of
developing prostate cancer, as well as other forms of cancer,
he should take steps to improve his lifestyle such as quit
smoking, eat better and cut back his alcohol consumption.
The doctor suggests that this may reverse some of the effects
and reduce the patient’s cancer risk.
On the surface, some might view this information as
empowering for the patient because it gives them the oppor-
tunity to enact change in their diet and lifestyle to increase
their health. However, if we consider this more deeply, we
can see that placing the responsibility on the individual here
is problematic. As discussed previously, according to
Hedlund, in order for an actor to be responsible, there are a
number of components that are necessary: causation, cogni-
zance, obligation and capacity (Hedlund 2012). One could
argue that by performing this test, the healthcare professional
has established a link between the patient’s behaviours and
their risk of cancer, thereby fulfilling the first criteria, causa-
tion. By receiving the test results, the patient has been made
aware of their increased risks, fulfilling the second criteria,
cognizance. In addition, as the patient is seeking medical in-
vestigations in order to prevent developing a medical condi-
tion which would place additional burden on the healthcare
system, some might argue that he has an obligation to enact
change which will prevent the development of this condition
in order to benefit future generations.
However, by stating that these three criteria are fulfilled
carries with it a number of assumptions. First, it assumes that
enough is known about the interactions between behavioural
factors, such as smoking, drinking and diet, and their effect on
DNA methylation to guide medical recommendations.
However, to date, there is little in the way of evidence,
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particularly in humans, that epigenetic patterns can be altered
through medical, lifestyle and/or chemical interventions. The
doctor has also made the assumption that the results of the
DNA methylation study are due to the patient’s current life-
style behaviours and that by changing these behaviours, the
cause of the epigenetic signature will be removed and that this
will, in turn, lead to amelioration of their health. But what if
the patient grew up in a position of low socioeconomic status,
had poor nutrition from a young age and lived in an area with
high levels of pollution? This early exposure could also be the
cause of his epigenetic results, rather from his current lifestyle.
It also assumes that the patient has understood the results of
the test and the connections that the doctor is drawing between
his lifestyle and his risk of cancer. However, understanding
genetic and epigenetic risks represents a huge challenge for
both laypersons and experts.
Third, the ‘obligation’ criteria assumes that there is a col-
lective agreement about what constitutes ‘good epigenetic
health’ and that this is something that one can strive for
(Hedlund 2012). However, as Dupras points out, this is far
from straightforward (Dupras and Ravitsky 2016). For exam-
ple, it is possible that the patient’s epigenetic pattern is actually
due to his exposures during fetal development. The mismatch
model of disease development proposes that the fetus is,
through the mother, exposed to the kind of environment that
it is likely to be born into and the resulting epigenetic pattern is
imprinted in order to allow better adaptation once they are
born and throughout their lifespan (Bateson et al. 2004).
Using this logic, the patient’s epigenetic pattern is not abnor-
mal in and of itself. Rather, it is mismatched to the environ-
ment in which the patient is currently living. This theory
means that there is no such thing as a ‘normal’ epigenome
that one can aim for in order to achieve good epigenetic health
(Dupras and Ravitsky 2016). In addition, while one can imag-
ine that quitting smoking, eating a better diet and consuming
less alcohol would have a positive impact on his health, there
is currently insufficient knowledge in this field to conclude
that, even if our patient made radical lifestyle changes as per
the doctor’s recommendations, there would be any significant
change to his global DNA methylation levels and any in-
creased risk of cancer associated with this. This lack of evi-
dence for an ability to alter DNA methylation patterns there-
fore signifies that with our current level of knowledge, the
capacity criterion cannot be fulfilled.
Let us assume, however, that these criteria have actually
been met in that the patient is actually the cause of his in-
creased risk, is aware of it, that there is some concept of good
epigenetic health he can aim for and that there are interven-
tions available to reliable alter his epigenetic pattern. In order
to assign responsibility to him for his health, we would still
require that he was actually capable of doing something to
change it (Hedlund 2012). But what level of control does the
patient actually have to change their health status? Whether
the patient has the capacity to make these changes is question-
able, because individuals are embedded in different collec-
tives, such as families, friendship groups or work places, and
within these collectives, their choices are constrained in vari-
ous ways (Mol 2008). For this reason, rather than a choice
being an individual decision, it becomes a decision which is
either facilitated or not, by the collectives in which the indi-
vidual is embedded (Mol 2008). Perhaps our patient has a
stressful job, works very long hours and has no wife or chil-
dren. He has little time to make friends, and therefore, his only
stress release is to go out after work with his colleagues, who
also drink and smoke heavily. With these colleagues as his
only support network, implementing behavioural changes that
go against the behaviours of the collective is very difficult and
might result in a situation of isolation and deprivation.
Societal factors also impact on one’s capacity to implement
change. Consider that it might have taken our patient 6 months
from when he first developed symptoms to visit the doctor.
While this delay could have eventuated due to his long work-
ing hours, making it difficult to attend appointments during
the work day, it may also be culturally based as men (for
reasons relating to social constraints, such as job status or
gender role) are less likely to seek medical advice when they
are ill (Baker et al. 2014).
While we have established that it would be unjustified for
the epigenetic responsibility within this scenario to rest
(solely) with the individual patient, we need to think about
the responsibilities of other actors. We can, for example, con-
sider the role, and therefore the responsibilities, of the doctor
in this scenario. The role of a doctor is to promote the
wellbeing of their patient primarily through beneficence and
non-maleficence (Beauchamp and Childress 2001).
Superficially, it may seem that the doctor is fulfilling his re-
sponsibility to the patient by ordering the epigenetic testing in
order to determine the patient’s risk of cancer and provide
them with the opportunity to implement behavioural change.
However, if we consider the patient’s lack of capacity to enact
this change because of the collectives in which he is embed-
ded, then perhaps the doctor is actually doing more harm than
good by ordering epigenetic testing and disclosing the results
to the patient. If the medical information is not realistically
actionable, disclosure of the results from the epigenomic test
could easily lead to an increase of the patient’s concerns and
stress. If we also consider the nature of the lifestyle recom-
mendations provided, one might question whether the doctor
would have suggested anything differently, regardless of the
test outcomes. One might also suggest that it is a component
of the doctor’s role to take the situation of the individual pa-
tient into account by assessing how these ‘unhealthy behav-
iours’might be created by their social situations and therefore
how their ability to implement change might be constrained.
It is also important to consider what impact this knowledge
is likely to have on the patient. They may feel empowered by
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the knowledge that they have an increased risk of developing
cancer, because they have the potential to do something about
it. But what if he does take steps to improve his health and a
repeat methylation test shows no difference? This failure, de-
spite his attempts at compliance, is not likely to empower him
to take steps to improve his health in the future. What if the
patient does not make lifestyle changes and he develops can-
cer? Is he more responsible for his health status than someone
who has not had their epigenome tested, because they were
informed about their risks? In order for an individual to bear
more responsibility, they must also be given more power.
Therefore, just giving the patient information is not enough
to increase their level of responsibility. Despite this, although
it may be unjustified to place the responsibility on an individ-
ual for their epigenetic health, such that they should be blamed
for their ill health if it eventuates, it might still be beneficial to
empower individuals to take better care of themselves gener-
ally as this could lead to disease prevention, seeking help
which may result in early identification, and potentially access
to a broader range of possible treatments.
In addition to caring for patient wellbeing, over time, there
has also been a shift, driven by patient preferences, from pa-
ternalistic models of care to those which have a greater focus
on patient autonomy and self-determination (McCoy 2008;
Quill and Brody 1996). This shift to promote autonomy
should entail providing the patient with the ability to give
informed consent for the test. Given the complex nature of
epigenetics, one can imagine that it would be difficult to ex-
plain the potential outcomes, including the potential for inci-
dental findings, related to the test in sufficient detail for the
patient to make an informed decision about submitting their
sample for testing.
Of course, there are also financial implications associated
with using this technology which need to be considered. On
one hand, the information about the patient’s increased risk of
cancer could be used to benefit the patient. If they did develop
cancer, then perhaps they would be entitled to reduced rates
for their investigations, treatments and general medical ex-
penses because they were ‘epigenetically disadvantaged’.
But would this still be justified if the patients were informed
that they were at risk, had the knowledge of how to reduce
their risk and chose not to change their behaviours? On the
other hand, one could foresee health insurance companies
using this kind of information to their advantage and charging
higher premiums to those who were deemed to be more at risk
based on their epigenetic profiles, similar to their current prac-
tices relating to asking consumers about their smoking behav-
iours and family history. If we consider what are the respon-
sibilities of insurance companies in this situation, one could
argue that they are responsible both for providing the service
the consumer is paying for, and also for the way they charge
for that service to be equitable (i.e. prices are dependent on
some predetermined, logical and consistent stratification).
Therefore, based on the current knowledge and within a lib-
eral context, using epigenetic profiles to stratify the con-
sumers’ premiums might lead to contexts in which discrimi-
nation based on epigenetic characteristics is produced. In par-
ticular, even if legal provisions created in several states and
communitarian institutions prevent discrimination in general
(European Parliament 2000) and on the base of genetic char-
acteristics (German Ethics Council 2013; Slaughter 2007),
that often equate to epigenetic information, this might not
translate to concrete avoidance of discriminations for persons
living in daily social contexts.
We can instead consider whether corporations should take
responsibility for the health of individuals. In this scenario, if
we assume that our patient’s increased cancer risk is due to his
unhealthy behaviours, the tobacco, alcohol and fast food in-
dustries are all contributing to his potential to acquire ill
health, both through making their products accessible and
through their advertising campaigns. Would it be reasonable
to expect these actors to assist members of the society to
implement behavioural change? And if so, what kind of model
might this follow? One possibility might be that the taxation
of the corporations’ profits producing and trading toxicants,
like plastics, dyes, tobacco, oil or carbon, would be allocated
to fund those parts of the healthcare system that might take
care of those people suffering from diseases caused by those
chemicals. Nevertheless, given that transnational companies
do not want to be considered as liable for the increase of
number of persons living with and dying from diseases caused
by those chemicals (Chapman 2004; Hirschhorn 2004), at
what level this negotiation should take place is highly prob-
lematic. Indeed, traditional institutional decision-making pro-
cesses are far from considering other forms of negotiation like
environmental conflicts among local residents, civil society
groups, private industry profits and public, national and com-
munitarian institutions (Greyl et al. 2013; Martinez-Alier et al.
2016; Perez et al. 2015).
Scenario 3—prenatal care
A 23-year-old woman, who lives in a low socioeconomic area,
goes to a general practitioner because she suspects that she is
pregnant. The doctor confirms the pregnancy, the woman’s
first, and they discuss her options. She decides to continue
the pregnancy, and the doctor discusses lifestyle changes she
should make in order to increase the health of the fetus, such
as ceasing smoking, avoiding foods considered ‘risky’ during
pregnancy (unpasteurised cheeses, uncooked fish, etc.) and
also the importance of adequate nutrition. The doctor asks
about the woman’s eating habits and identifies that she has a
poor diet that is both inadequate in nutrition, to ensure the
health of the baby, and is also comprised predominantly of
packaged foods. The doctor mentions that there is some
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evidence to suggest that, from an epigenetics perspective, eat-
ing large quantities of foods that have been exposed to partic-
ular plastics that contain endocrine disrupting chemicals can
carry considerable health risks to the fetus, such as abnormal
uterine and cervical development (Bondesson et al. 2009;
Brotons et al. 1995; Casas et al. 2011). In addition, the doctor
informs her that poor maternal nutrition can result in cardio-
vascular disease when the child reaches adulthood. The doctor
suggests that in order to promote the health of her baby, she
should drastically reduce her consumption of packaged prod-
ucts and eat more fresh food.
While in scenario 2 we discussed the responsibilities of an
individual patient to implement behavioural change in re-
sponse to epigenetic information about his own health, here
we are focusing on the responsibilities of this young, pregnant
woman to implement behavioural change in order to enhance
the health of her future child. On the surface, this does not
seem very different from the expectations we normally place
on women during pregnancy. The internet is riddled with in-
formation (and misinformation) about what women should do
during pregnancy in order to ensure the health of their baby.
Women are instructed not to drink alcohol, not to smoke, to eat
folate-rich foods, to exercise, to be careful about exposure to
kitty litter, to avoid undercooked meat and eggs, to avoid
unpasteurised cheeses, to avoid too much caffeine, to eat fish,
but not too much fish, etc. However, what differs in this sce-
nario, compared to the standard expectations placed on wom-
en to adapt their behaviours to promote the wellbeing of their
future child, is that some of the advice the doctor is
recommending is to promote the health of the future child
based on epigenetics.
To explore whether the mother-to-be in this scenario has
any responsibility to change her behaviour in response to this
information from her doctor, we must first consider the moral
status of the fetus and the obligations of mothers to their un-
born children more broadly. Authors have suggested that al-
though women are free to choose whether they want to con-
tinue a pregnancy, once a pregnant woman has decided to do
so, she, and other members of society, then have fiduciary
obligations towards the fetus (McCullough and Chervenak
2008). The determination of the point at which these obliga-
tions commence is based on the idea that the fetus is not viable
(i.e. able to sustain its life independently), so its ability to
become a child is dependent on whether the woman decides
to continue the pregnancy (McCullough and Chervenak
2008). Although the fetus does not have independent moral
status and therefore no ‘rights’, it has dependent moral status,
based on the role it is ascribed by the mother-to-be, the doctor
and the society. According to McCullough and Chervenak
(2008), this dependent moral status means that there are be-
neficence-based, rather than rights-based, obligations towards
the fetus. However, once a mother-to-be has decided to con-
tinue the pregnancy, some have postulated that the fetus may
then acquire a different moral status—that of a future per-
son—with their own full moral rights (Loi and Nobile
2016). If we accept this argument, then not only would the
mother-to-be have a responsibility to act in a way that protects
the future health of the fetus but also it would be justifiable for
the State to reinforce this if the mother was non-compliant
because ‘[…] the interests of future children and adults matter
as much as the interests of pregnant mothers’ (Loi and Nobile
2016).
If we accept then that the mother-to-be has an obligation to
promote the health of the fetus, we need to consider whether
she has the capacity to do so given (a) the reliability of the
information she has been provided, and (b) the situation in
which she is embedded. In relation to the reliability of the
information, there is considerable evidence that exposure of
the fetus to high levels of endocrine disrupters leads to disor-
ders in the development of the reproductive system and there-
fore that exposure to these chemicals should be avoided
(Bondesson et al. 2009; Casas et al. 2011; Fernandez et al.
2016; Skinner 2014). There is also evidence to suggest that
poor maternal nutrition during pregnancy leads to low birth
weight and also increased risks of cardiovascular disease
(Barker et al. 1993). Therefore, taking steps to improve her
diet is likely to lead to better health outcomes for the child,
both in the short and in the long term. But is it realistic to
expect her to reduce her intake of packaged foods that contain
endocrine disrupting agents and to eat a more nutritious diet?
In reality, at the level of the individual and without support, the
options for our pregnant woman are quite limited. Firstly, she
needs to be provided with information so she can make in-
formed decisions about which foods to choose. Perhaps she
has never been educated as to which foods have greater nutri-
tional value or taught how to cook good quality meals, be-
cause this is how her parents ate. She might also currently live
with the father of the child-to-be who also works long hours
and has poor knowledge of what constitutes a good diet, and is
therefore not going to be able to provide support in her at-
tempts to change her diet. In addition, the information that she
receives from the doctor might be quite confusing for her
because, at first glance, to advise someone to both increase
food intake and also to restrict intake of particular foods
might seem contradictory. This could result in further reduc-
tion in food intake by not eating packaged foods without re-
placement with more nutritious foods, increasing the overall
risk of cardiovascular defects for the child-to-be.
If we think about the role of the doctor in this scenario, they
might feel that they have informed her of the risks to her future
child so she is empowered to enact change to improve their
health. However, perhaps all they have done is place the bur-
den of responsibility on the woman, making her anxious about
a situation that she is not in a financial or social position to
change. Or perhaps she will attempt to change her eating
habits. Although the doctor may feel that he fulfilled his
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medical obligations, one might consider the doctor irrespon-
sible to disclose this kind of information without also provid-
ing assistance in implementing behavioural change. But what
kinds of solutions might actually be beneficial in this
situation?
Although her doctor might be able to provide her with
some of the educational aspects, she also needs to be able to
access and afford the healthy options if she chooses to do so.
We know that she has a low socioeconomic status, so it may
be difficult for her to afford to buy fresh produce when often
packaged and processed foods are much cheaper, due to their
poorer quality. Perhaps she works very long hours and eats
these sorts of meals because they do not require much cooking
time. If she is quite motivated, she might, for example, start
driving to a different supermarket, which is an extra 20 mi-
nutes away, in order to shop for fresher foods. But this takes
more time, so she has less time to cook meals than she already
had, which means she misses out on sleep, which is also not
healthy for her or the fetus. Or maybe she will start buying
fresh foods rather than packaged ones from her local super-
market. But this is more expensive, and she needs to work
even longer hours to cover the costs, which has the same
effect. All of these factors mean that her ability to implement
behavioural change in order to enhance the health of the fetus
might be impaired. But does the fact that it might be difficult
for the mother-to-be to enact change mean that she should not
be informed of her potential to do so? While one might argue
that informing her may place an unrealistic burden on her, on
the other hand, not passing on this information removes any
possibility for her to improve the future health of her child.
A number of authors have drawn attention to the inaccurate
weighting, and therefore unfair responsibility, that is placed on
the maternal contribution to the disease states of their future
children (Hedlund 2012; Kenney and Müller 2016;
Richardson et al. 2014). As Richardson et al. state, there is
‘the need for societal changes rather than individual solutions’
(Richardson et al. 2014). Therefore, in order to provide the
kind of support this pregnant woman needs, we need to think
about the potential for other actors to assist at the societal
level. For example, the public health sector has an interest in
having a healthier population, both because they have the
ultimate goal to foster the right of members of the society to
health and also because this places less of a burden on hospi-
tals. Therefore, although education could be provided to an
individual woman by a health practitioner, one could also
consider whether larger health institutions could organize ed-
ucational sessions for pregnant women in order to target more
of the population, as implemented in Denmark (Lemus 2015).
One might consider giving food allowance vouchers to preg-
nant women to shop in organic food stores. However, if we
think about the mismatch model, then this means that once the
child is born and the food vouchers cease, children may not be
epigenetically ‘programmed’ to their environment. Instead,
perhaps representatives could assist pregnant women living
in urban areas to establish a farmers’ market by giving them
guidance and connecting them with local producers. This
would create ongoing access to fresh food by adopting a
‘teach a man to fish’mentality. Policy-makers could also play
a role in assisting pregnant women to avoid eating packaged
foods, such as developing policies which place pressure and
obligations on food producers to reduce the use of harmful
plastics. Of course, the development of these interventions and
support systems should always involve discussions with the
members of the society who need them in order to understand
the problems and ensure that the strategies are appropriate to
the population. Therefore, it would be important to set up a
dialogue with women who might want to change their diet to
determine precisely which barriers are preventing them from
achieving this behavioural change. Only then can the State
effectively implement these strategies. Nevertheless, in those
cases in which a negotiation takes place, citizens, consumers
and lay people might not understand, or even be confused, by
policy-makers and experts. Indeed, scientific opinions and
regulations of chemicals such as endocrine disruptors can be
contradictory. Take for instance the 2010 statement produced
by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) about
Bisphenol A, a plastic used in food packaging that is an en-
docrine disruptor (EFSA Panel on food contact materials and
processing 2010). The 2010 statement produced by EFSA
declared the safety of Bisphenol A. In contrast, in 2010 the
Danish Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), instead
prohibited the use of Bisphenol A in all food contact material
for children aged 0-3 years. On the base of studies showing the
exponential effects on human health of combination of endo-
crine disruptors, in 2012, the Danish EPA banned four
phthalates from all consumer products (phthalates are mole-
cules used, for instance, to soften food packaging, that in
combination with Bisphenol A might easily increase health
problems of individuals and their children) (Lemus 2015). Or
consider the French ban for using Bisphenol A in all food con-
tainers, underpinned by the French Agency for Food,
Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety (ANSES).
In this specific case, there is an explicit conflict between national
and communitarian institutions thatmake scientific opinions and
policies less understandable for experts and lay people. There
are various solutions here. for instance, local communities might
organize meeting days with information materials, scientific ex-
perts and institutions based in the same area, to proactively adapt
to specific, situated contexts. At the same time, it might be
important to consider dissenting opinions and facts on biomed-
ical research and public health policies, in order to actively en-
gage citizenry and lay people in science and politics. Last but not
the least, it is important that scientists, technicians and re-
searchers embrace a more comprehensive analysis (i.e. com-
pared to the airy and principlistic approach of bioethics) of the
issues produced in the science/society interaction.
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Scenario 4—the workplace
The CEO of a power plant has received reports that a number
of employees have recently been diagnosed with a range of
cancers affecting various different tissues, such as the lungs,
skin and bladder, and various oral and esophageal carcinomas.
Their medical advisor suggests that this may be due to expo-
sure to benzo[a]pyrene (BaP), a polycyclic aromatic hydrocar-
bon that is produced through incomplete combustion (Tong
et al. 2006) and classified by the International Agency on
Research on Cancer (IARC) as carcinogenic in animals and
humans (IARC 2010b). BaP is lipid soluble, accumulates in
adipose tissue and is transferred across the placenta and the
fetal blood-brain barrier (Brown et al. 2007; Hood et al. 2000).
BaP has shown both genetic and epigenetic toxicity (Perera
and Herbstman 2011). Moreover, BaP is an endocrine
disruptor - a steroid-mimicking chemical affecting fetal
growth (Choi et al. 2006), cognitive development and behav-
ioural disorders. Studies on animals have shown that BaP
interferes with early brain development, peripheral lympho-
cyte development and causes alterations in levels of noradren-
aline, dopamine and serotonin (Konstandi et al. 2007;
Stephanou et al. 1998; Tekes et al. 2007). Concerned both
for the other employees, and also for the reputation of the
company, the CEO, along with the board, decides that all
employees must submit their samples for epigenetic testing
in order to assess their current DNA methylation levels.
Those who are shown to have low global DNA methylation
levels will be given a payout but will lose their jobs, because
they are considered to be at high risk of cancer and should not
continue to be exposed to BaP. Those with more normal levels
of DNA methylation will be allowed to remain in their posi-
tions. However, they will be required to sign new contracts
where they commit to health-promoting behaviours, such as
exercise and good diet in order to combat their BaP exposure.
In this case, epigenetic tools can have several non-
overlapping potential uses and the interventions developed
following epigenetic testing could serve a gamut of solutions,
each focusing on a different level. One solution might focus
on the worker as not being epigenetically adapted to a specific,
toxic environment. Another might focus on the workers’
habits conceived as a means to individually adapt and cope
with damaging pollutants. Alternatively, the focus could be on
the company as responsible for damaging the environment, its
inhabitants and especially the workers. Here, the major issue
is the compatibility, or lack thereof, of all these uses of epige-
netic testing. Is it possible to, at the same time, protect the
health of the workers, the industrial activities and the popula-
tion more broadly, including the workers’ families?
As we have outlined in previous scenarios, it is unfair to
place all of the responsibility on the individual workers for
their own health, as the employers here are doing by making
them sign a contract committing them to undertake activities
to optimize their health in response to the risks posed by their
work environment. Because they have greater power, corpo-
rations need to take on more responsibility for the health of
their workers. But what actions might be possible in response
to this scenario? It is possible that both the groups of workers,
those who were fired and also those asked to sign a contract,
might decide to initiate a lawsuit against the employers. Those
who were fired might invoke legal intervention on the base of
their right to work. Perhaps the factory is in an economically
depressed area that is disbanding most of its industrial sites
and without social measures of welfare to guarantee the fired
workers either a decent subsidy or alternative jobs. Those who
were obliged to sign a new contract might decide to file a
lawsuit against the employers on the basis of violation of the
environmental law on health and safety of workers. In this
case, those most motivated to initiate the lawsuit might be
the workers’ family members, specifically their partners and
children, because the workers themselves are under occupa-
tional blackmail, being forced to choose whether to live or to
work. We need to also consider whether epigenetic testing
ordered from the employers is discrimination operated at the
workers’ expense. Should the company have the right to ask
employees their health status in order to fire those who might
already have been damaged from the pollutants? Can we in-
voke laws and regulations, such as the ‘Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act’ that prohibits employers from asking
and using the individuals’ genetic information when making
hiring, firing or job placement (Slaughter 2007)?
We could envisage this legal action as a negotiation be-
tween all the actors interested in the rights and welfare of
workers and citizens, which might be lacking in some coun-
tries. We can imagine that a regional agency that takes care of
the environmental protection, together with some grassroots
movements that want to protect the people living in the area
surrounding the plant, might also enter the scene. These grass-
roots movements may initiate a massive media campaign to
encourage the public to boycott the company. These actors
from the civil society aiming at enhancing public and commu-
nal goods might then push institutional bodies to order other
tests in order to analyse the association between epigenetic
dynamics present in the workers’ samples with exposure to
BaP. On the basis of these outcomes, the regional agency
might order the closure of the plant to convert it into a more
sustainable and less polluting activity, a move that would also
cut many job positions.
A theoretical point is slowly emerging to overwhelmingly
disrupt the existing tradition of epidemiology and public
health. Historically, epidemiological knowledge that was
meant to be generalizable for most animals and human popu-
lations, derived from in silico, in vitro, in vivo, logical/
mathematical models, cell cultures, model organisms and co-
horts of humans, has been translated into public policies
which are meant to be universally applicable. However,
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epigenetics, by some of its accounts, seems to say something
different and points to the capability of each specific organism
to cope with a specific environment. Is the focus of epige-
netics on individual biological plasticity challenging those
preventive policies developed by communitarian agencies on
pollutants of various kinds, habits or jobs (Davis 1986)? Now,
the entity causing a disease may not only (and not primarily)
be a specific molecule or human behaviour but also the genet-
ic or epigenetic susceptibility of a person to that specific dis-
ease, e.g. a specific epigenetic makeup, programmed in the
early phases of development, that may eventually not match
with a specific environment. Within this ‘mismatch’
aetiological model, what are the responsibilities given to those
actors or factors that shaped the two, non-matching environ-
ments (i.e. the perinatal environment that programmed the
individual, and the environment in relation to which the adult
develops the disease)? Is there a resurgence of the importance
given to plasticity of an individual’s biological makeup in
spite of environmental, sociocultural factors? Will biological
plasticity be used to rank individuals, classes, genders, etc. as
was proposed some decades ago, by right-wing Lamarckians
(Meloni 2016b)?
Discussion
In all these four scenarios, we have shown that epigenetic
testing is mainly used to scrutinize the relationship between
individuals, public and private institutions, future generations
and the environment, be that material or social in nature.
Depending on the context in which epigenetic testing is em-
bedded, these relationships will carry with them certain roles,
and therefore responsibilities, for the actors involved.
Compared to the sociological notion of genetic responsibility,
where the emphasis is on individuals, as we have illustrated,
epigenetic responsibility could instead redistribute roles with-
in the community. In this sense, epigenetics may allow for
better realization of the relational concept of responsibility.
Indeed, the biological concept of inheritance has been
reshaped by epigenetic studies (Gilbert 2011; Gilbert and
Epel 2009; Meloni 2016a). During the last century, we have
witnessed the birth of, and increasing importance given, to
genetics and individual agency. This normative genetic shift
corresponds with changes in the moral obligations of individ-
uals, withdrawal of solidarity and reduction of professional
responsibility (Schicktanz 2016). If epigenetics is used within
the same ideological framework where the agency of individ-
uals plays a main role to the detriment of collective agency,
then other important concepts will be reshaped and responsi-
bilities reallocated. What we have tried to sketch here is the
use of epigenetic tools and models within dialogical scenarios
where different actors from several levels of the society are
considered. We have focused mainly on the agency of
individuals, corporations and the State; concepts that are often
overlooked within the current scientific literature and dis-
course on epigenetics.
Caring for oneself, for future generations and for environ-
mental protection, are aspects which are interlinked and per-
tain to interactions among individuals, the State and the pri-
vate sector, and are under negotiation at a global scale. These
three notions, and their interactions, challenge the individ-
uals’, communities’ and public or private entities’ conception
of time relating to the length and effects of an event (e.g. what
effect does the quantity and quality of diet have for a person’s
health for the next month, versus for the next 20 years of
health of her child?). The interaction between the three notions
of individuality, next generations and environment also raises
questions regarding who should be the moral agent to whom
responsibilities are allocated. For example, are workers or
citizens responsible for their own health, or should the em-
ployers, the industry and the State also be considered as re-
sponsible for certain environments that contribute to diseases?
In addition, the interweaving of these three notions to redis-
tribute responsibilities is captured by the temporal direction
(backwards or forwards) considered by the scientific enquiry,
such as whether researchers should focus on preventive poli-
cies to help people not get sick or should they instead focus on
developing therapeutics to cure and care for persons with dis-
eases? And how should limited research resources be allocat-
ed between these two views? Allocation of responsibilities is a
process following norms that are under the supervision of
authorities that are defined within specific forms of govern-
ment and at the State, supranational or corporate levels.
Moreover, the norms used to allocate these responsibilities
might be used to produce regulations in which processes,
actors or subjects will be considered, such as whether empha-
sis could be placed either on scientific/epistemic norms or on
social norms. For example, should scientific practices and
theories impacting directly, and at different levels on the peo-
ple’s lives, be discussed through norms developed by the civil
society or are scientific/epistemic norms sufficient to regulate
science and its effects on society?
In some of the scenarios in this paper, we have situated our
point of view sympathetically with certain scientific ‘truths’,
such as that hard drinking and smoking is an unhealthy habit
for men and women, whether they are pregnant or not. This
might make it difficult for the reader to disentangle epistemic
truths from philosophical, ethical andmoral arguments. This of
course might be considered either a limitation or a point of
advantage, depending on their point of view. On one hand,
having plausible case scenarios and scientifically informed
stories might improve the comprehension of practices and
ideas. On the other hand, being partisan on specific scientific
truths might propose a simplistic picture of science, in which
facts are instead both realistic and constructed, depending on
negotiations and interests of stakeholders. As an example, a
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molecule like Bisphenol A is, to date, considered toxic by
some countries like France or Denmark but not by the
European Union to whom these two countries belong. At the
same time, considering a scientific fact as true might obscure
the moral, ethical and political aspects of concrete situations,
reducing these latter aspects to epistemic arguments, and lead-
ing to obligations and ethical imperatives. Furthermore, as epi-
genetics was developed in a specific period of time in which
the States were less challenged by translational corporations
and globalization, it is of primary importance to consider the
models and practices of epigenetics within specific contexts
where international networks of research can be aligned to
interests of different actors, such as national or supranational
public institutions, translational corporations or foundations
and grassroots movement of citizens.
We have challenged the importance given to individual agen-
cy, both in practice and as a concept, in that it does not allow for
concrete possibilities of action for individuals. Indeed, being in-
cluded in a framework of liberal governance, epigenetics ismain-
ly used to discipline individuals considered as isolated from their
social and economical contexts (Santoro 2010). Here, we instead
propose a model in which a dialogical relationship among col-
lective, individual, private and public agencies, is put in motion.
As we have shown, epigenetics can be used to foster either indi-
vidual or social rights. Trying to establish an equilibriumbetween
social and individual rights by means of epigenetics practices
might be a manner to foster social justice.
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